### Contention 1 is Restricted Economics

#### The topic of economic engagement is constrained by the conception of a restricted economy, the resolution itself defends an economic rationality that presupposes a utilitarian calculus. Economic engagement shouldn’t be a question of whether there is a benefit to lifting the embargo with Cuba, or trading with Mexico, or investing in Venezuela’s oil industry; economic engagement shouldn’t be conditioned on the necessity of a utility behind each and every action that precedes it. Thus the ballot is a choice- between the restricted and rational economics ensured by a normative affirmation of the resolution, or an embrace of general economics through our affirmation.

Human and Cilliers 13 (Oliver Human, Professor of Philosophy at University of Stellenbosch, Paul Cilliers, Professor of Complexity and Philoshophy at the University of Stellenbosch and PhD in philosophy at Cambridge, Towards an Economy of Complexity: Derrida, Morin and Bataille, pgs 34-35, 8-1-13) aln

Bataille (1989) argues that traditional political economy restricts its analysis of a system to the production and consumption of resources, limited to the immediate ends they serve. According to restricted economics, ‘on the whole, any general judgement of social activity implies the principle that all individual effort, in order to be valid, must be reducible to the fundamental necessities of production and conservation’ (1989: 117). Restricted economics is therefore utilitarian, only interested in the use value any object or activity may have. The problem with this model, for Bataille, is that it does not take into consideration the ‘excesses’ and so called ‘waste’ produced by a system. In contrast to the notion of restricted economy, Bataille argued for the notion of ‘general economy’ which aimed to include within its analysis the excesses and waste not considered by a restricted worldview. The ‘law of general economy’ states: On the whole a society always produces more than is necessary for its survival; it has a surplus at its disposal. It is precisely the use it makes of this surplus that determines it: the surplus is the cause of the agitation, of the structural changes and of the entire history of society. But the surplus has more than one outlet, the most common of which is growth. (Bataille, 1991: 106) For Bataille, the impact which a surplus has on the nature of a system is not reflected upon by restricted economies of analysis which limit their analysis to notions such as utility and thereby exclude, and are unable to explain, other forces which act upon the system. It is for this reason that Bataille (1989) argues that restricted economic worldviews struggle to explain the occurrence of such phenomena as war, sacrifice or eroticism. These aspects of human life and history remain sidelined and are seen as marginal to the ‘more important’ aspects of survival. Yet it is precisely these marginalized forms which give shape to the societies we live in (Bataille, 1991). General economics tries to incorporate these aspects of life which are considered pure expenditure, or ‘excess’, into its frame of analysis. However, as we have already argued, we always operate from a limited, context dependent position. Bataille in this sense tries to ‘reeconomize’ our thinking by attempting to take into consideration the excess of the frames we use when describing economies purely in utilitarian terms. In other words, Bataille tries to include all social activity in his analysis; he aims to overcome the limits of the economies we create due to our situated perspectives. However, as Bennington (1995) illustrates, by focusing on the waste or excess produced by a system, Bataille is structuring his analysis around a single concept (that of excess) in the same vein as the restricted economies he is critiquing: In its most abstract form, this suggestion would say that ‘general economy’ is not the other of ‘restricted economy,’ but is no other than restricted economy; that there is no general economy except as the economy of restricted economy; that general economy is the economy of its own restriction. (Bataille, 1991: 47–8, emphasis in original) The argument here is simple enough: in order to be an economy, it must by definition operate as if it is restricted; an economy cannot contain everything. We argued above that when we model a complex system our analysis will always be restricted, due not only to our limited perspectives but also due to the fact that our models need to deal with the inevitable uncertainty of our existence and still be coherent and logical. We deal with this uncertainty through the use of reason, which Derrida (2005: 151) defined as a wager between the calculable and the incalculable. As such there will always be an excess. Excess, by definition, exceeds reason (Derrida, 1978: 255, quoting Bataille). This excess we have labelled heterogeneity.7 What the notion of general economy does is to establish a relationship to this excess (Derrida, 1978: 270). In Derrida’s exploration of Bataille we can note the double handed movement of the deconstructive process which aims to maintain the radical nature of Bataille’s critique whilst at the same time illustrating the impossibility of a ‘pure excess’ without an economy to which it corresponds (or ‘sovereignty’ as Bataille labels it). Derrida argues that we need to remember that we can only speak of one economy (of one discourse); it is senseless in this regard to postulate two different kinds of economy, one restricted and the other excessive or general. That is, we cannot postulate an economy of excess which runs parallel to the restricted economy or a general economy in which there is only excess. When we speak of a general economy it is not an economy separate from a restricted economy; rather, it is a single economy which is not closed but is both open to random chance events as well as predictability, open to the possibility of destruction and yet robust, whether it comes from the play of forces inside the system or from its relationship to its environment (Derrida, 1978: 272). The models we construct of such systems must keep in mind that a system does not run on an entirely rational, utilitarian basis, but is open to the possibility of paradox and inconsistency yet still displays enough stability in order to be comprehended. The notion of general economy describes an economy with open boundaries and also a play of forces inside the system. Such an economy is neither the strictly restricted economy of traditional political economy or of classical science which denies the partiality of any perspective, nor is it an economy of excess (whatever that may look like). The double handed logic of Derrida allows us to conceive of this economy as being limited, constrained and restricted and, at the same time, as being open and excessive. What makes this possible? The notion of ‘play’ is crucial to this understanding.

#### This economic system necessitates a limiting and vouchsafing of life that makes life a denial of itself. Our anti-utilitarian affirmation of general economics is a necessary opposition to the tenets of utility that destroy sovereignty and put it in the hands of the profane.

Biles 11 (Jeremy Biles, teaches philosophy at the Illionois Institute of Art, super cool guy, <3’s Bataille, The Remains of God: Bataille/Sacrifice/ Community, 11-24-11, p 130-133, Culture Theory and Critique, Taylor and Francis) aln

This energetic surplus, according to Bataille, must be eliminated. Once the growth of a system has reached its limit, the excess ‘can only be wasted’, ultimately squandered in nonproductive expenditure. For Bataille, there is no choice in this matter; the excess energy, in the form of the ‘accursed share’ of wealth, is condemned to destruction; it ‘must be spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically’ (Bataille 1991: 11, 21). Though surplus ‘must be dissipated through deficit operations’, the manner in which the consumption takes place is – to some degree, at least – a matter of choice; we may ‘bring about in our own way’ what we would otherwise ‘undergo’ with disastrous consequences (Bataille 1991: 22, 23). The quintessential catastrophic form of expenditure from Bataille’s perspective is war, which results from demographic expansion enabled by surplus and the concomitant increase in resources, productive capabilities, and technology – the ‘industrial plethora’ (Bataille 1991: 23–5). On the other hand, the excesses of energy may be expended ‘gloriously’. Religion, according to Bataille, has staged major occasions for the necessary squandering of wealth. Festival celebrations, opulent temples, orgiastic rituals, potlatches, mystical experiences, and sacrifices, especially on a monumental scale: each of these designates some form of glorious consumption, an ebullition in which energy is explosively released. But useless expenditures also occur beyond the sphere of traditional religions, in other experiences that Bataille deems ‘sacred’: erotic effusions, fits of laughter or tears, artistic and poetic exudations, and various forms of intoxication. 130 Jeremy Biles All such expenditures – useless, diverted from any utilitarian ends – obviously ‘go against judgments that form the basis of a rational economy’ (Bataille 1991: 22). Indeed, the imperative to waste and the related glorious modes of expenditure that fascinate Bataille are inimical to the calculations that define a restricted economy based on the tenets of limited resources and concern for securing future interests. But it is this consideration of the future, of advantageous utility, that deprives humans of sovereignty. Sovereignty, by Bataille’s account, is linked with experience of the sacred, and refers to escape from the realm of work, subjugation to labour, calculation, and instrumental reason – in short, the realm of the profane. Following Emile Durkheim, Bataille posits a radical heterogeneity between the sacred and the profane, while also dividing the sacred between what subsequent scholars have called the right sacred – the powers of order, power, purity, eternity, and life – and the left sacred, aligned with the dangerous forces of corrosion, decay, impurity, time, and death (see Durkheim 1965: 455–6). Bataille argues that the divide between the sacred and the profane arises in conjunction with the advent of labour. He relates labour to the establishment of the subject/object dichotomy in human consciousness, suggesting that ‘the positing of the object [or the “thing”], which is not given in animality, occurs in the human use of tools’ (Bataille 1992a: 27). Subordinated to the one who uses it, a tool is assigned a utility, a telos beyond its immediate existence, and thus takes its place within a newly emergent sphere of ‘discontinuous’ objects that now includes oneself and others. ‘With work’, Michel Surya has written, ‘mankind discovered ends . . . . And all ends are a calculation speculating on the benefits of the future, . . . all ends separate humanity from itself’ (2002: 383).With the rise of self-consciousness, of oneself as a separate, distinct individual, also comes the fear of death and the corresponding desire for durable, even eternal, existence. Subjugated to mortal anxiety, ‘man becomes a thing’; gripped by the fear of death and the yearning to endure, humans are rendered servile – relegated, like tools, to the world of instrumental utility (Bataille 1993: 218). The desire for durable – even eternal – existence is thus vouchsafed to instrumental reason. Bataille identifies the realm of instrumental reason with the sphere of the profane; it is the realm of discontinuous objects and individuals. The sacred, on the other hand, is characterised by a sense of intimacy; it is the sphere of continuity, which objects, in their distinct forms, transcend. For Bataille, then, ‘existence is profane when it lives in the face of transcendence; it is sacred when it lives in immanence’, or continuity (Hollier 1998: 65).

#### That culminates in an ascetic resentment and hatred of life- we must embrace a chaotic relationship to existence

Turanli 03 (The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 26 (2003) 55-63, Nietzsche and the Later Wittgenstein: An Offense to the Quest for Another World, Aydan Turanli, Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Istanbul Technical University).

The craving for absolutely general specifications results in doing metaphysics. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche provides an account of how this craving arises. The creation of the two worlds such as apparent and real world, conditioned and unconditioned world, being and becoming is the creation of the ressentiment of metaphysicians. Nietzsche says, "to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative" (WP III 579). Escaping from this world because there is grief in it results in asceticism. Paying respect to the ascetic ideal is longing for the world that is pure and denaturalized. Craving for frictionless surfaces, for a transcendental, pure, true, ideal, perfect world, is the result of the ressentiment of metaphysicans who suffer in this world. Metaphysicians do not affirm this world as it is, and this paves the way for many explanatory theories in philosophy. In criticizing a philosopher who pays homage to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche says, "he wants to escape from torture" (GM III 6). The traditional philosopher or the ascetic priest continues to repeat, "'My kingdom is not of this world'" (GM III 10). This is a longing for another world in which one does not suffer. It is to escape from this world; to create another illusory, fictitious, false world. This longing for "the truth" of a world in which one does not suffer is the desire for a world of constancy. It is supposed that contradiction, change, and deception are the causes of suffering; in other words, the senses deceive; it is from the senses that all misfortunes come; reason corrects the errors; therefore reason is the road to the constant. In sum, this world is an error; the world as it ought to be exists. This will to truth, this quest for another world, this desire for the world as it ought to be, is the result of unproductive thinking. It is unproductive because it is the result of avoiding the creation of the world as it ought to be. According to Nietzsche, the will to truth is "the impotence of the will to create" (WP III 585). Metaphysicians end up with the creation of the "true" world in contrast to the actual, changeable, deceptive, self-contradictory world. They try to discover the true, transcendental world that is already there rather than creating a world for themselves. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the transcendental world is the "denaturalized world" (WP III 586). The way out of the circle created by the ressentiment of metaphysicians is the will to life rather than the will to truth. The will to truth can be overcome only through a Dionysian relationship to existence. This is the way to a new philosophy, which in Wittgenstein's terms aims "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle"

#### A restrictive economy has forced humans to become economically servile- we are slaves to the future of our economy. Unless we make the choice to transition to a general economy we will forever be servile to scarcity and necessity.

Sauer-Thompson ‘3 (Gary Sauer-Thompson, Lecturer in Philosophy at Flinders University of South Australia, Sovereignty & the Economy, 11-11-03, <http://sauer-thompson.com/conversations/archives/001084.html>, aln)

Bataille’s restrictive economy is the contemporary marketplace as we know and live it. In it we are economically servile and a slave to the future. In it we are servile humans who labor in the economy for the sake of the future, to prepare for the future. We servile humans labor to earn money so we can buy goods and consume them. In effect, he is preparing for a temporary sovereignty in the future, as Bataille relates sovereignty to consumption. This restrictive economy is based on scarcity and necessity. Goods are scarce, otherwise we servile humans could just take what we need from an infinite supply. We servile humans need these goods for consumption, otherwise he would have no reason to labor for them. This is the world of classical political economy, which presupposes scarcity and necessity, and obliges us to labors for the future. In this restricted economy we will always be servile. Now we do attempt to achieve sovereignty in the later consumption of our earnings from the marktplace, such as buying clothes, food and lesiure. But we are really only consuming to survive in order to labor more. So even in our consumption we are servile beings. Things are quite different in the general economy, which is based on the idea of consumption, of luxurious expenditure. Here sovereignty comes by consuming without producing. The argument is spelt out well in this link I came across. It says that a general economy based on consumption "....is based on the idea that systems, both natural and economic, have excess energy. This excess energy may be used for growth, but given limits of space--an environment cannot accommodate an infinitely growing system--growth must stop or at least slow down at some point. It is then that the question of how to use excess energy comes into play. In natural systems, excess energy can be given off as heat loss. But in human societies, the expenditure of excess energy is what defines a culture. In terms of individuals, it is those that do the expending that are sovereign. The sovereign individual consumes only, and is not concerned with scarcity, necessity, or utility. He has at his disposal the results of the servile man’s labor, he can consume what he wants, and he is not concerned with profit, for it is his job to waste. The sovereign is completely free of concerns about the future and lives only to consume in the present." So sovereignty for Bataille is based on the dissipation of excess energy and it involves dedicating ourselves to the expenditure of energy. What he does is flip Marx and the economists on their head. He argues that the question of the economy is not always one of coping with scarcity; it is one of coping with excess or superabundance. There is an anthropological aspect to this. In Volume 1 of The Accursed Share Bataille explored the crucial role of sacrificing or destroying the "excess" produced in any economy through a series of historical examples. These include the Northwest Coast Indians' potlach; the sacrificial rites of the Maya; the territorial imperative of early Islam, and the massive monasticism of Tibetan Lamaism. Bataille locates the excess, the "accursed share" with the different mode of dispersal in this historical societies. of which these otherwise widely varying cultures have had to cope. A society can do many things with its excess; it can throw it into refuse pits, it can expend it in endless war, or it can disperse it with a massive movement of non-production as in Tibetan monasticism.

#### Rational and restricted economics subordinates the self and stockpiles reserves of human energy, the docility of current expenditure forces the subject to be docile. An embrace of inefficiency, of uselessness, and of intimate expenditure is necessary to transform life from a standing reserve by reminding us of the madness that is the general economy.

Igrek 9 (Apple Zefelius Igrek, Professor in Philosophy at the University of Seattle, Modes of Luxurious Walking, September 2009, muse, aln)

The multi-layered, complex, book-length answer elaborated in Bataille's Peak cannot be given here. The shorter answer, however, can be stated in two parts. First, Bataillean expenditure should be modified by taking into consideration qualitative differences between docile and insubordinate forms of energy. The fact that the former is a finite, quickly disappearing resource implies that we can no longer afford to ignore, as Bataille could, the issues of energy depletion and cultural decline (Stoekl 42). Drawing from two Heidegger essays, "The Question concerning Technology" and "The Age of the World Picture" (1977), Stoekl contextualizes weak, mechanized forms of expenditure by reference to fossil fuel consumption. Because we assume the world exists for us in a quantifiable way - to be conquered, stockpiled, and used up - we ourselves become a disposable thing or object: "Man the subject for whom the objective world exists as a resource is quickly reversed and becomes man the object who, under the right conditions, is examined, marshaled, and then releases a specific amount of energy before he himself is definitively depleted" (131). Docile energy, Stoekl surmises, makes for docile subjects. Only after we have acknowledged this contemporary fact are we able to complement the first part with a second: insubordinate forms of energy are essential to insubordinate forms of action. In the general movement of social ecstasy and expenditure, by way of which we transgress ourselves in moments of physical intimacy, we open the isolated self to an immensity which can be neither measured nor stockpiled. Nor can it be experienced through the timeless efficiency of the car: "As the ultimate common denominator, the car brings together, in the isolation of vapid subjectivity, social classes and identities. All are one on the freeway, mixing while not mixing, moving around the empty circuit of gutted urban space" (184). The simulacrum of freedom is achieved through speed, empty signifiers, and the indifferent reproduction of subjectivity. Excess is thus transformed into pure stream of consciousness, and our "cursed flesh" disappears as an abstract, useless obstacle to absolute technological freedom. By contrast, the inefficient movement, the clumsy and death-bound use of time, holds out the best promise for a post-sustainable future: walking, dancing, cycling, and spending oneself in a wounded but effervescent fusion of the self with the other (190). Passion and ecstatic movement in the post-fossil fuel era will therefore "be one of local incidents, ruptures, physical feints, evasions and expulsions (of matter, of energy, of enthusiasm of desire)" (190). As opposed to a closed economy of the useful, practical self, in which every moment of loss is immediately sublimated as a higher purpose and function, Bataille's affirmation of an intimate relationship with the world and others necessarily subordinates the higher truth - and every mode of instant communication - to a formless substratum or base matter that will forever escape human domination. This twofold response helps Stoekl to resituate contemporary arguments on both Empire and the totalized city. Drawing from Michel de Certeau's "Walking in the City" (1980), Stoekl traces the historical loss of the body through the creation of a universal, albeit anonymous, modern subjectivity. The automobile, as already put forth, reframes reality so that everything is construed according to an "always but never changing image on the (wind)screen" (184). The car thus becomes a grand historical symbol of speed, freedom, transcendence, and the conquest of nature. But at the same time, none of this is possible without fuel. The same subject that manifests itself as pure movement and pure sovereignty is also a function of certain finite resources. Insofar as de Certeau fails to consider the role of cheap fossil fuel inputs in connection with the utopian and totalized city, he is unable to rethink the expenditure of energy as a mode of resistance to modern networks of conformity and surveillance. Stoekl, however, sees in de Certeau's walker an intimation of another kind of energy subversion. What is crucial at this historical juncture isn't only the unusual and peculiar connotations of the walker in contrast with the commodified autonomy of the driver, but furthermore the "spectacular waste of body energy" (188). This movement of intimate corporeal existence, wasting itself on a "grossly inefficient" effort (192), gestures toward something beyond the virtual reality of today's Empire. As the universal city is no longer restricted by space or time, even the speeding car is being outpaced and outdistanced by the ubiquitous circulation of signs, images, and capital. And as the global scale shrinks to the size of instantaneous communication, the old dualities of private and public, society and nature, real and artificial, are quickly vanishing. Yet this very dialectic, which seemingly overcomes itself in a new, bland form of media domination, cannot possibly exist without a specific relationship to labor. Stoekl observes that in this respect Hardt and Negri, who would reduce all natural phenomena to moments of history (196), remain firmly tethered to Marx and Kojève—at least inasmuch as the historical returns us to a concrete function of labor. But even human labor has its limits. It is no more autonomous than the myth of Man which it intermittently supports, for it produces nothing in the absence of fuel (x). And fossil fuels are a natural fact: "Labor power discovered these fuels, put them to work, 'harnessed' them, transformed their energy into something useful. But labor power did not put the fuels into the earth" (197). There are, consequently, limits to Empire. And one of the most crucial limits, for us, is the imminent depletion of highly concentrated forms of energy. If the global spectacle is slowing down and a sustainable response is hardly sustainable (as Stoekl previously argued), it seems that we will have to rethink excess expenditure. Bataille's Peak performs this task on every page, and does so in the most formidable, difficult terms—by reminding us of the general finitude, exertion, madness, and jouissance of bodily economies.

#### Dehumanization from treating all life as a standing reserve makes every impact possible

Berube ’97 (David, Ph.D. in Communications, “Nanotechnological Prolongevity: The Down Side”, NanoTechnology Magazine, June/July 1997, p. 1-6, URL: http://www.cla.sc.ed...ube/prolong.htm)

This means-ends dispute is at the core of Montagu and Matsou’s treatise on the dehumanization of humanity. They warn “its destructive toll is already greater than that of any war, plague, famine, or natural calamity on record – and its potential danger to the quality of life and the fabric of civilized society is beyond calculation. For that reason this sickness of the soul might well be called the Fifth Horseman of the Apocalypse… Behind the genocide of the Holocaust lay a dehumanized thought; beneath the menecide of deviants and dissidents… in the cuckoo’s next of America, lies a dehumanized image of man… (Montagu & Matsou, 1983, p. xi-xii). While it may never be possible to quantify the impacts dehumanizing ethics may have had on humanity, it is safe to conclude the foundations of humanness offer great opportunities which would be foregone. When we calculate the actual losses and the virtual benefits, we approach a nearly inestimable value greater than any tools which we can currently use to measure it. Dehumanization is nuclear war, environmental apocalypse, and international genocide. When people become things, they become dispensable. When people are dispensable, any and every atrocity can be justified. Once justified, they seem to be inevitable for every epoch has evil and dehumanization is evil’s most powerful weapon.

#### There isn’t an impact to death because humans are just energy- yet we are all ethically responsible to gloriously expend our own energy.

Stoekl 7 (Allan Stoekl is a Professor of French and Comparative Literature at Pennsylvania State University. “Bataille’s Peak: Energy, Religion, and Postsustainability,” pg. 189-191) Henge

“Expenditure without return” is a floating concept, defined in opposition to the restrained economy whose possibility it opens but which it defies. As an end not leading outside itself, it could be anything; but what is most important is that with it there is a movement of “communication,” of the breaking of the narrow limits of the (ultimately illusory) self - interested individual, and no doubt as well some form of personal or collective transport, enthusiasm. This concern with a mouvement hors de soi can no doubt be traced to Sade, but it also derives from the French sociological tradition of Durkheim, where collective enthusiasm was seen to animate public life and give personal life a larger meaning.11 As Bataille puts it in L’économie à la mesure de l’univers (Economy on the Scale of the Universe): “You are only, and you must know it, an explosion of energy. You can’t change it. All these human works around you are only an overflow of vital energy. . . . You can’t deny it: the desire is in you, it’s intense; you could never separate it from mankind. Essentially, the human being has the responsibility here [a la charge ici] to spend, in glory, what is accumulated on the earth, what is scattered by the sun. Essentially, he’s a laugher, a dancer, a giver of festivals.” This is clearly the only serious language. (OC, 7: 15– 16) Bataille’s future, derived from Durkheim as well as Sade, entails a community united through common enthusiasm, effervescence, and in this sense there is some “good” glory—it is not a term that should be associated exclusively with rank or prestige. Certainly the Durkheimian model, much more orthodox and (French) Republican, favored an egalitarianism that would prevent, through its collective enthusiasm, the appearance of major social inequality. Bataille’s community would continue that tradition while arguing for a “communication” much more radical in that it puts in question stable human individuality and the subordination to it of all “resources.” On this score, at least, it is a radical Durkheimianism: the fusion envisaged is so complete that the very boundaries of the individual, not only of his or her personal interests but of the body as well, are ruptured in a community that would communicate through “sexual wounds.” De Certeau brings to any reading of Durkheim an awareness that the effervescence of a group, its potential for “communication,” is not so much a mass phenomenon, an event of social conformity and acceptance, but a “tactics” not only of resistance but of intimate burn -off and of an ecstatic movement “out of oneself.” If we are to think a “communication” in the post–fossil fuel era, it will be one of local incidents, ruptures, physical feints, evasions, and expulsions (of matter, of energy, of enthusiasm, of desire)—not one of mass or collective events that only involve a resurrection of a “higher” goal or justification and a concomitant subordination of expenditure. Yet there is nothing that is inherently excessive. Because waste can very easily contribute to a sense of rank, or can be subsumed as necessary investment/ consumption, no empirical verification could ever take place. Heterogeneous matter—or energy—eludes the scientific gaze without being “subjective.” This is the paradox of Bataille’s project: the very empiri-cism we would like to guarantee a “self -consciousness” and a pure dépense is itself a function of a closed economy of utility and conservation (the study of a stable object for the benefit and progress of mankind, etc.). Expenditure, dépense, intimacy (the terms are always sliding; they are inherently unstable, for good reason) are instead functions of difference, of the in - assimilable, but also, as we have seen on a number of occasions, of ethical judgment. It is a Bataillean ethics that valorizes the Marshall Plan over nuclear war and that determines that one is linked to sacrifice in all its forms, whereas the other is not. In the same way we can propose an ethics of bodily, “tactical” effort and loss. We can go so far as to say that expenditure is the determination of the social and energetic element that does not lead outside itself to some higher good or utility. Paradoxically this determination itself is ethical, because an insubordinate expenditure is an affirmation of a certain version of the posthuman as aftereffect, beyond the closed economy of the personal and beyond the social as guarantor of the personal. But such a determination does not depend on an “in -itself,” on a definitive set of classifications, on a taxonomy that will guarantee the status of a certain act or of a certain politics.

### Contention 2 is Debate

#### Alex and I affirm a sacrifice of the resolution

#### **Sacrifice of the objects closest to us is necessary to draw them out of the world of utility- our sacrifice of the resolution restores it to the realm of the sacred and stops it from being subjected to the domination of labor and debate that renders it a mere thing.**

Biles 11 (Jeremy Biles, teaches philosophy at the Illionois Institute of Art, super cool guy, <3’s Bataille, The Remains of God: Bataille/Sacrifice/ Community, 11-24-11, 132-144, Culture Theory and Critique, Taylor and Francis) aln

 ‘God (the wound)’: inner experience and eroticism as sacrificial communication In this sense, then, a sacrifice is always a sacrifice of God, of work hypostatised, for sacrifice is anti-utilitarian, wasteful, amode of glorious consumption. That which is genuinely sacred is revealed in sacrifice to be insubstantial – not eternal, but only a ‘privileged instant’, a ‘moment of communal unity, a moment of the convulsive communication of what is ordinarily stifled’: the range of human passions and intoxications at their extremes (Bataille 1992a: 242, 241). To live out the full meaning of Nietzsche’s declaration of God’s death is thus to attain a kind of madness in which rational thought is suspended in a momentary experience of rupture with the profane world and a fusion among previously distinct beings. If God ‘represent[s] the only obstacle to the human will’, then to sacrifice God means to ‘[surrender], nude, to the passion of giving the world an intoxicating meaning’ (Bataille 1992a: 245). And yet, the sacred, by its very nature, is fleeting; the passional effluxes of sacrifice inevitably wane, and the aims of instrumental reason invariably reassert themselves, giving rise again to the fear of the loss of self, and with it, the tendency to hypostasise work in the form of God. The remains of God, like the profane self that always returns, are never finally eradicated; prohibitions are re-installed, and the world of rational utility endures. Individuals are again themselves, discontinuous and isolated by the profane concerns of the workaday world and traditional social structures, deprived of the deep sense of continuity, or intimacy, that is afforded in transitory experiences of sacred community. Bataille’s aim in thinking community beyond communism, and ultimately beyond any ‘communitarian enterprises’ (Nancy 1991a: 17), is to accede to a point of sovereignty, an experience of excess that transgresses the boundaries of the profane world, and the system of taboos that uphold the work of instrumental reason. Taboos protect against the excesses – in particular violence and perverse, non-procreative sexuality – that threaten to destroy those who elicit and engage them. But far from a quest for masterful control, sovereignty, for Bataille, is ecstatic abandonment – the rupture of the closed, individual self as formed through social prohibitions and work. Sovereignty is not, then, a state, a durable status, but rather an excessive and fleeting experience of explosive affects, of passion, as in artistic delirium, outbursts of tears or laughter, varieties of intoxication, and erotic effusions in which the God of reason is incessantly sacrificed. In fact, eroticism and mysticism, closely linked in Bataille’s thought, are two privileged domains of sovereign experience. Eroticism ‘always entails a breaking down of established patterns . . . of the regulated social order basic to our discontinuous mode of The Remains of God 133 existence as defined and separate individuals’ (Bataille 1986: 18). In the erotic encounter, Bataille claims, one ‘[assents] to life up to the point of death’ (1986: 11); the risk upon which eroticism is predicated is a ‘conscious refusal to limit ourselves within our individual [, discontinuous] personalities’ (1986: 24). By upsetting ‘the physical state associated with self-possession, with the possession of a recognized and stable individuality’, the ‘little death’ of the orgasm brings the subject outside of himself, into an experience of continuity with the other (Bataille 1986: 17–8)

#### Like the restricted economics of the status quo, the politics of the resolution operates as a fear of death, as a securing of our future, and a protection of reason. Utility necessitates the blocking off of the flow of energy and ensures that we cannot intimately expend.

Biles 11 (Jeremy Biles, teaches philosophy at the Illionois Institute of Art, super cool guy, <3’s Bataille, The Remains of God: Bataille/Sacrifice/ Community, 11-24-11, 132-144, Culture Theory and Critique, Taylor and Francis) aln

The anxious desire for durability corresponds to a demeaning substantialisation of the sacred. According to Bataille, genuine sacrality is not a ‘substantial reality’, but is, on the contrary, ‘an element characterized by the impossibility of its enduring’ (Bataille 1985: 241). The ascendancy of reason, the fear of death, and the will to securing the future bring about a corresponding elevation of these profane concerns to the status of the ‘right’ sacred. Indeed, the profane world of utility is projected into an idea of God as a substantial and eternal being, transcending the sacred world of immanence and the lethal forces of time. It is for this reason that Bataille characterises the personal God as the ‘hypostasis of work’ and the ‘profanity of this world’ (1994: 82; Surya 2002: 384). ‘God’, Bataille claims, is ‘the end of things, is caught up in the game that makes each thing the means of another. In other words, God . . . becomes a thing insofar as he is named, a thing, put on the plane with all other things’ (1993: 383). Within Bataille’s thought, then, God is an expression of the fear of death and the corresponding will to shore up one’s individual self, attempting to procure, through reasoned calculations that would secure the future, a sense of enduringness, eternity. In making God the elevated figure of reason, duration, and eternity, Christianity, claims Bataille, ‘made the sacred substantial’ – a mere thing (1985: 242). God becomes an expression not of the sacred, but rather a ‘tenacious obsession with the lastingness’ of our individual selves (Bataille 1986: 16). Understood this way, God represents an impediment to what Bataille refers to as communication, the intimacy afforded by the dissolution of the self in experiences of sovereign expenditure. It is thus this ‘God of reason’ – the God of salvation, of enduring forms, of eternal life – that must be the victim of an ‘incessant sacrifice’ that will restore sovereignty (Bataille 1988: 88; 1993: 378). Bataille’s theory of sacrifice illuminates this point. According to Bataille, the victim of a sacrifice is always something subjected to the ‘domination of labor’ – rendered a mere thing. The sacrificial object, whether human or animal, is drawn out ‘of the world of utility’ and restored to the realm of the sacred, for sacrifice annuls an object’s ‘ties of subordination’. Although sacrifice destroys the object it renders sacred, its aim is not mere obliteration. Bataille makes the crucial point that ‘the destruction that sacrifice is intended to bring about is not annihilation. The thing – only the thing – is what sacrifice means to destroy in the victim’ (1992a: 43). This is to say that in being destroyed, what had been made servile, an instrument or tool within the realm of utility and reason, is rendered useless. In this sense, then, death is the realm of the sacred, of immanence, for it is in death that the boundaries that delineate and separate objects in the world are temporarily transgressed, destroyed, thus returning those objects to the intimate domain of continuity. The contagious force of sacrifice is such that its lethal effects extend from the victim to those who witness its immolation. Bataille argues that in sacrificial rituals, the consecrated sphere promotes a sense of heightened attention by which the participants in the ritual identify with the victim being put to 132 Jeremy Biles death. At the moment that the throat of a sacrificial animal is slashed, for example, the witnesses to the sacrifice likewise undergo an experience ‘on the level of death’; their sense of enclosed subjectivity is, for a time, ruptured, and intimacy is restored in an experience of deep communication. ‘The individual identifies with the victim in the sudden movement that restores it to immanence (to intimacy)’; he undergoes a fleeting experience of dissolution in the realm of the sacred.

#### The 1ac uses the tools of reason and utility to work against themselves- our sacrifice destroys the telically governed project of normative economic engagement, and of normative policy debate

Biles 11 (Jeremy Biles, teaches philosophy at the Illionois Institute of Art, super cool guy, <3’s Bataille, The Remains of God: Bataille/Sacrifice/ Community, 11-24-11, 132-144, Culture Theory and Critique, Taylor and Francis) aln

This communication, this ecstatic and often tormenting loss of self in continuity with others, is what Bataille refers to as ‘fusion’.6 Inner experience ‘attains in the end the fusion of object and subject’, he writes. Putting to death the God of reason, however, requires putting the tools of reason to work against themselves in a ‘counter-operation’. ‘Reason alone has the power to undo its work, to hurl down what it has built up’. In this way, the principle of inner experience is to ‘emerge through project from the realm of project’. Bataille’s hostility towards the project was one point of polemics with Jean-Paul Sartre, whose existentialist philosophy held that humans are defined by their projects, are coextensive with their projects (see Sartre 2007). For Bataille, however, a project amounts to ‘the putting off of existence to a later point’, and thus placing hope of salvation in some secured and enduring future, the domain of utility elevated to a metaphysical beyond (Bataille 1988: 46). The God of reason thus takes form in the utilitarian, telically governed project. Bataille’s atheological investigations are the sacrificial counter-operation to the Sartrean project. For Bataille, the death of God means God is the ‘victim of a sacrifice’. To say that: ‘God should be dead’ . . . differs as much from the evasion of a God in the notion of a clear and servile world as does a human sacrifice, which sanctifies the victim, from the slavery which makes of it an instrument of work. (1988: 133; translation slightly altered) Bataille seeks an experience that imitates that of the sacrifice of God in the form of Christ on the cross – a crucifixion at once desired and anguishing. Understood in this register, the imitatio Christi above all means that ‘we must imitate in God (Jesus) the fall from grace, the agony, the moment of . . . the “lama sabachthani”; drunk to the lees, Christianity is absence of salvation’, the refusal to put off existence in some beyond (1988: 47). Emerging from the profane realm of project through a sacrificial operation means putting God as a thing – an eternal, substantial object – to death, and thereby being opened to the experience of time. The personal God must be wounded, must, in fact, become the wound in individual integrity that allows for an experience of sacred continuity. The lama sabachthani is the cry acknowledging God as nothing, as no-thing: the shared experience of the nothingness of death. It is the wound of ecstasy through which communication occurs. ‘Ecstatic, breathless, experience each time. . .opens a bit more the horizon of God (the wound)’ (1988: 103–4; translation slightly altered). Erotic and mystical experiences thus both partake of a sacrificial counteroperation whose culmination is ecstatic rupture. Both produce the wounds through which previously enclosed beings communicate, rendering them fused, for a fleeting time, in a desired death, or nothingness. The convening of eroticism and inner experience is made startlingly clear in Bataille’s atheological novella Madame Edwarda, a narrative, told in the first person, detailing a young man’s encounter with the eponymous prostitute. Madame Edwarda debauches the young man, shocking him out of his usual state of consciousness by obscenely spreading her legs and insisting that he gaze upon her ‘old rag and ruin’. She declares to the man, ‘I’m GOD’, as he drops to his knees before her ‘teeming wound’ (Bataille 1989: 150).7 Eroticism and mysticism, as understood by Bataille, thus evoke and sacrifice God – the God of utility, stability, and eternity – in a single stroke.

#### **Normative debate has chosen a profane sacrifice- we read our politics disadvantages, our economic collapse impacts, all in the name of stopping war. This restricted economic concern is founded upon an alignment with war over festival- refuse this curriculum to embrace a general economic composition.**

Sirc ’95 (Geoffrey Sirc, PhD Composition Theory at the University of Minnesota, Professor in the Department of English at the University of Minnesota, Godless Composition, Tormented Writing, http://jaconlinejournal.com/archives/vol15.3/sirc-godless.pdf, JAC Vol. 15 No. 3- 1995) aln

The sacrifice composition has chosen (for there must be sacrifice; there is always too much energy, it must be wasted) is a perverse, profane sacrifice; our liturgy is a sad, heartless rite. How can I want life, then, and feel anything but disgust for a curriculum of writing-as-servility? I am urged by a respected name in my field, out of a restricted-economic concern for how we "manage our linguistic resources," to forget poetry and advance the goal of helping stu4ents "enter the conversation of the academy and begin to contribute to the making of knowledge" (Lindemann 314, 313). How can I take this seriously when I have seen the awful path that knowledge has led us down? What other words can escape my lips? All profound life is heavy with the impossible. Intention, project together destroy .... Existence has since begun again, banal, and based on the appearance of a knowledge. I wanted to escape it, to say to myself: this knowledge is false. I know nothing, absolutely nothing. But I know: "nonknowledge communicates ecstasy." (Inner 58) Our curriculum, in its stubborn insistence on the modern sacrificial choice of technology, discards the body's sacred, aligning itself with war over festival. The Somme is a record of life during wartime, an era that should be all consuming, and which should rhyme well with Bataille's notion of what comprises humanity ("supplication, war, anguish, madness" [Inner 37]). But the war for Bataille, as recorded in his journals, rarely equals (except in his horror at bodily torment) the one in his own head. War-time expenditure of energy becomes a hollow, repulsive use of excess when compared with other sorts of primitive eruptions. Bataille is so strangely (humanly) a part of and apart from scenes: a resistance truck picks up collaborationist prisoners; Bataille writes about it as if it were a movie or a tableau he's viewing en route to his real (inner) life (On 163-164). As much as he wants immanence with the French workers (On 157), he can't help the transcendent urges. So the war against Germany, this spectacularly violent depense, amounts to a tragic, soul-deadening torture-scene; another modern waste of the possible. Very much, Bataille evokes Bill Coles. One could imagine a student of Coles, trying to break on through in writing, consumed by such self-changing passion: "With whatever passion and cruel lucidity I can bring to bear, inside of me I wanted life to be naked. I've been working on this book since the war broke out and everything else is emptiness as far as I'm concerned" (Guilty 39- 40). Coles would understand that, would understand a Godless composition, because he knows of the "world where the meaning of writing is not a given ... a world such as we're living in, where nothing can be taken for granted in our classrooms about what it means to write a sentence in English" ("Literacy" 250). Coles knows that one person's sense ofa literate tradition, as ''vital inheritance ... legacy ... a kind of trust fund of the spirit," is simply another person's "deadweight accumulation of a thousand thousand rag and bone shops of as many foul hearts" ("Literacy" 250). Coles can understand such naked passion, a desire for a seeming impossible, making a fragmented ruin of the formal, in the hopes of reaching an inner experience: "The paper is obscure then, an example, perhaps, of disparate experience insufficiently amalgamated, of a new whole unsuccessfully formed" ("Commentary" 327). Coles realizes exactly how writing communicates: a sense of pain and circulating blood underlying words, designed to weave us together, to touch each other, to heighten each other. It is excess in search of a vague, unsatisfied desire: "I am pushed by this paper, have been for years, to the edge of irresponsibility, to becoming as a reader what I never figured I'd have to become as a reader of student writing-not better, but more alive" ("Commentary" 328). The search for the summit, the heterogeneous view, ruptures Coles' course into a non-sense ("the sense of nonsense" is the title of one of his early articles), so he ends up approaching a pedagogy of the impossible: "a way of teaching what cannot be taught, a course to make possible what no course can do" ("Teaching" 111). The contradiction that surrounds Coles' pedagogy surrounds Bataille as well: "I no longer even seek to understand," Bataille wrote in 1939, "for I can do so only in reaching for something almost inaccessible and only rarely possible" ("Ascent" 105). So on one hand, Bataille advocates no project, on the other he takes on the ultimate project of delineating the world's general economy; here he is disgusted by work, there he is "desperately working"; here he is disillusioned with reason and advocating unknowing, there he is "making interconnected outlines of knowledge" (On 109). But it makes a non-sense-the project/Work/knowledge world would be nothing if not for the negation, the death-tension. It's torment as heuristic. "Confusion as a method .... My life (or rather my lack of one) is my method. Less and less do I question to know .... And I question in order to live. Ilive out my quest" (On 110). I think that self-canceling alogic suffuses the best that has been written in composition studies. For what can a general economy of composition, having to cover so many instances, be but always unwriting itself?

#### Scholarship is a waste of time. Education is a waste of time. The 1ac was a waste of time- all that matters is that we accept this waste of time, that we accept that not everything can be utopic- only then can we truly achieve value, or ethics.

Mellors 13 (Anthony Mellors, Professor in English departments of Oxford and Durham Universities, and at The Manchester Metropolitan University, Refusing Impact: Aesthetic Economy and Given Time, pgs 40-61 of SubStance Volume 42, Number 1 published in 2013, anuss)

Perhaps this further indeterminacy is dissemination "itself"? If so, it highlights the problem of risk in relation to temporality in that those activities which struggle to comply with demands for quickly deliverable outcomes—e.g., scholarship, scientific experiment, art—can only create value by running the risk of being a waste of time. Much the same could be said of entrepreneurship, even though its stated object is making money, and one of the ironies of advanced capital is that it seeks to eliminate the risk that allows it to innovate in the first place. What remains intolerable to business, and certainly to its bureaucratic state arm, which destroys the unaccountably innovative by insisting on its accountability, are activities that not only delay outcomes but do not start out with the goal of self-interested outcomes. Connor confesses that his valuing of "the rhythm of delay, the delay of rhythm," looks like "a simple return to aestheticist or liberal claims for the autonomy and non-utility of art," but argues that this [End Page 55] has new significance in the context of a global market, for which "nothing that does not produce or can be registered on a scale of value can be recognized" (98-99). Beyond art, the principle is ascetic and ethical and points Connor towards the deconstructive "value of suspending every value...the permanent ethico-political necessity for ethics and politics to be thought through and with the other-directed saying, responding and responsibility of other discourses such as the literary" (227) while guarding against utopian accounts of value, such as those of Fredric Jameson and Terry Eagleton, which wish "value away into a strictly unattainable future" based on the return to a myth of pure use-value (156). Socialism, he argues, needs to "begin the long work" of abandoning the humanist ideal of an organic society before or beyond exchange (the gift again) and move "beyond reification and fixation into the productive possibilities of the unconstrained evaluation of value" (157). The problem here is that socialism is given as a value that must be upheld and revised; but how do we arrive at socialism prior to the process of transvaluation? A similar issue takes place in Drucilla Cornell's The Philosophy of the Limit , which argues for a deconstructive ethics of the Other as the basis for an "ideological critique" of law. Where, for example, the myth of legal precedents discriminates against women and homosexuals, Cornell suggests that Derrida's "critique" shows that the gender hierarchy, and with it, imposed heterosexuality, is "ideology" in that it is not and cannot be made "true" to lived, individual sexuality. In turn he shows that the gender hierarchy violates the moment of universality that inheres in the recognition of the phenomenological symmetry of the Other. (175) The scare quotes around "true" make the lived nature of sexuality disingenuous. A paragraph later, Cornell notes that "even if gender identity is just a role into which we are cast by the rigid structures of culture, we still play it, like automatons, as we take up our positions in the gender hierarchy" (ibid.) All identity is constructed, and human desire is the puppet of culture, yet a special case can be made for the living value of the sexualities Cornell wants to rescue from injustice. Caught between phusis and nomos , her ethics is subject to the deconstruction she claims as the ground of ideological critique. Since she has always already established the right of women and gays not to be discriminated against in law, deconstruction becomes a kind of supplementary justification after the fact, and one that exposes the indeterminate (and in law irresolvable) ground on which her theory sits. And this remains the problem for Left critique, which tends to regard theory both as a way of shaking the ground on which "natural" (= reified ideology = the right) values rest and as the ground of culturally provisional [End Page 56] values opening and justifying intervention. But if the emancipatory values broadly identified with the Left were not already in place, there would be no "Left" critique, merely critique. But critique, however altruistic, would be critique of nothing if it were not motivated by values. Therefore, it must identify and acknowledge those originary values in a way that both recognizes (insofar as it is possible to recognize one's motivations) their contingency and their political necessity. In effect, this means preserving something of the notion of disinterestedness as a constituent part of interestedness. By labelling disinterest a "bourgeois" misrecognition of interest, Bourdieu forfeits critique altogether. But this does not mean that his attack on the asceticism of reflection is without critical value, for even as it discloses the impasse of his own theory it guards against the complacency of claustral formalism. When Connor begins his work on cultural value by asserting that "[I]t will be necessary to be suspicious of every attempt to project oneself outside or beyond the field of socially constituted value through the various theories of the aesthetic, from the fraudulent disinterestedness of the aesthetic in Kant" and "refusing...any kind of aesthetic experience or form that does not implicitly begin the work of subjecting the ideal and identity of the aesthetic to self-reflexive critique" (6), he continues to invest in the value of self-reflexive critique and goes on to affirm the disinterested aesthetic he calls "fraudulent," albeit as a strategic response to the "general positivity of outcomes" (98) demanded by the global market. You cannot refuse or waste what you hold on to as a positivity, and Connor runs the risk of deconstructing his own reflexivity. Yet that "risk" may be the unavoidable and productive point of critique, the point at which even Barbara Herrnstein Smith's insistence that "no valorization of anything, even of 'loss' itself, can escape the idea of some sort of positivity—that is, gain, benefit, or advantage—in relation to some economy" must open itself to a critique of its conservative determination of positivity as utility (qtd. in Connor, 74).